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The Sixth Circuit Widens the Circuit Split on Broker Liability for Personal Injury

For some time, trucking and logistics companies have operated pursuant to the guidance of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”) and Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”), which, in part, protect brokers from liability at common law pursuant to 49 USC § 14501(c)(1).  The section reads, in pertinent part, that states “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier, or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 USC § 14501(c)(1).  This provision has long protected freight brokers from liability at common law for personal injuries arising out of motor vehicle accidents.

Five years ago, the Ninth Circuit, in Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., while agreeing that selecting a motor carrier fell within the brokers services, disagreed with the District Court’s finding of federal preemption and widened 49 USC § 14501(c)(2)’s ‘safety exception’. The Ninth Circuit established common law broker liability across nine states by finding “that negligence claims against brokers, to the extent that they arise out of motor vehicle accidents, have the requisite ‘connection with’ motor vehicles. Therefore, the safety exception applies . . . .” Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016, 1031 (9th Cir. 2020).  49 USC § 14501(c)(2) states that subsection (1) “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles,” but, before Miller, this exception did not encompass broker activities in selecting transporters when the brokers themselves were not operating motor vehicles.

Despite this ruling, both the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits upheld the Federal preemption on what were essentially identical common law negligence claims. In 2023, the Seventh Circuit held states were prohibited “from enacting or enforcing law relating to intrastate rates, intrastate routes, or intrastate service of any freight forwarder or broker.” Ye v. GlobalTranz Enters., Inc., 74 F.4th 453, 460 (7th Cir. 2023) (internal quotations omitted); see also Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023).  The Court in Ye specifically found that plaintiff’s attempt to bring a negligent hiring claim against GlobalTranz went “a bridge too far” and that “[t]he Act’s text makes clear that Congress views motor vehicle safety regulations separately and apart from those provisions imposing obligations on brokers.” Ye, 74 F.4th at 462.  The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Ninth’s rationale in Miller arguing that the Ninth Circuit “unduly emphasized Congress’s stated deregulatory purpose in passing the Act” and that this could not “overcome the clear statutory mandate that the exception . . . saves only those safety regulations directly concerning motor vehicles. Id. at 465.  Aspen and Ye sustained federal preemption on this issue in six Southeast and Midwestern states.  The aggrieved parties in Ye and Miller each sought review with the United States Supreme Court and were denied certiorari – despite the fact that the  the fact that the Ye Court acknowledged the Circuit split.

Confronted with this split – and the precedent that District Courts within the Circuit repeatedly found for Federal pre-emption – the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 8, 2025 in Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc. held that “where a negligent hiring claim against a broker substantively concerns motor vehicles and motor vehicle safety, that claim is within "the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc., 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 16650 at *24 (6th Cir. July 8, 2025) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A)).  The Court, in reaching this conclusion, held that Cox’s claim that Total Quality Logistics “negligently hired an unsafe motor carrier to transport goods by motor vehicle” fell within a “specific class of common law negligence claims” reaching the conclusion that those claims fell within a State’s regulatory authority. Id.

This diametrically opposes the holdings in Ye and Aspen, which articulated the same legal theory that the broker entity was allegedly “negligent in hiring an unsafe motor carrier whose driver caused a highway accident . . . .” Ye, 74 F.4th at 464–65.  Though this Circuit split did already exist due to the decision in Miller, the practical impact of this split is far more pronounced.  The states covered by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits do not border any state within the jurisdiction of the Ninth.  The Sixth Circuit, however, is an amalgam of jurisdictions with Michigan and Ohio in the Midwest and Kentucky and Tennessee in the Southeast – the two regions covered by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, respectively.  The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits encompass within their respective jurisdictions Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.  The Cox decision now creates conflicting laws between two bordering states in seven distinct instances between states that fall within the jurisdiction of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits.  For the law to change for brokers when freight is carried across the border between Michigan and Wisconsin or Tennessee and Georgia is untenable.  Brokers will see their exposure to liability shift literally while freight remains in transport.  It is likely that the Supreme Court has little choice but to resolve this disagreement and issue a final determination as to whether federal preemption for broker liability in personal injury matters still exists pursuant to the ICCTA and FAAAA.

It is important to acknowledge that, while there remain courts that interpret 49 USC § 14501(c) as preempting broker liability, this protection does not extend to motor carriers of passengers.  49 USC § 14501(a) does not include similar language to subsection (c) applying the preemption to brokers in the motor carrier industry.  That subsection (a) does not mention brokers in any respect is noteworthy.  Brokers generally were more ubiquitous in the freight industry as opposed to the passenger industry, but that is changing.  Companies are utilizing technology to create broker-like services for commercial passenger transportation.  That the statute does not mention this in any respect is likely more reflective of the newness of this industry.  It is unlikely any Court would extend the protection in subsection (c) to brokers of passenger motor carriers and such a change would require legislative action in the future.